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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CARL ALTON WINFIELD,

Case No. 20040382-SC

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Can defendant challenge the adequacy of the trial court's jury voir dire
examination—or the potential impartiality of the jury panel—where he affirmed that
the examination had been sufficient, and passed the jury panel for cause?
Defendant alleges that the trial court's jury voir dire examination was plainly
erroneous, see Aplt. Br. at 12, 19, but below he affirmed that the trial court's jury voir dire
examination was sufficient and also passed the jury panel for cause. See R202:60. Any
arguable error on the part of the trial court was thus invited. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT
15,ffl[62-63,

P.3d

(declining to review claimed instructional error where defendant
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"signal[ed] by an affirmative act that he had no objection" to court's instruction below); State
v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54,70 P.3d 111 (holding that where "counsel, either by statement
or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury
instruction, [the appellate court] will not review the instruction" even under plain error
exception). Accordingly, because defendant invited any arguable error here, and because he
does not allege that his pro se representation was ineffective, defendant's claim on appeal is
procedurally barred. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("Because
Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of
the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal").
2. Did defendant use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon to rob the Sonic
Drive-in, where he pressed a hard object into an employee's back, pushed her forward
with the object, demanded money, and grabbed the bank bag from another employee?
This insufficiency claim was not preserved in defendant's motion for directed verdict,
see R203:496 ("The State hasn't proved any money was taken"). See State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, ^f 16, 10 P.3d 346 ("[A] defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by
proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal"). A general objection is
insufficient to preserve a specific substantive issue for appeal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
316 (Utah App. 1993). Defendant's insufficiency claim is therefore waived. Ibid
Moreover, because defendant does not allege that the trial court plainly erred in not sua
sponte directing a verdict due to allegedly inadequate evidence that he used—or threatened

2
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to use—a dangerous weapon, or that he himself was ineffective for not asserting the same,
see Aplt. Br. at 23-30, his sufficiency challenge is procedurally barred. Pledger, 896 P.2d
atl229n.5.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-301 (West 2004):

(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of anotherfromhis person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft or
wrongful appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful
appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
UTAH CODE ANN,

§ 76-6-302 (West 2004):

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of
a robbery.

3
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-601 (West 2004):

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: . . .
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any
other manner that he is in control of such an item.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge, Conviction, Sentence and Appeal, Defendant was charged with aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony. Rl-2. Following a two-day jury trial, he was convicted as
charged. R165. At the conclusion of trial on 28 April 2004, defendant waived preparation
of a pre-sentence report and the trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate term of five
years to life. R133. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R168-169. This Court
thereafter transferred the case to the court of appeals, see R170, but the transfer order was
subsequently rescinded. See Order, dated 12 April 2005.
Facts.1 Adorned with a shopping bag tied bandanna-style around his head, and armed
with a hard object, defendant robbed the Sonic Drive-in, in West Valley City, Utah. Pressing
the hard object into an employee's back, defendant demanded, "Give me the money. Don't
do anything. Give me the money." R202:84; see R202:75, 83, 87, 93 141, 144, 147, 155.

lr

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
4
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He then pushed the employee forward with the object, grabbed the bank bag from the
assistant manager's lap, punched the general manager in the face, and escaped. R202:86-87,
89,148-50,183-184,186.
#

#

*

At approximately 5:00 p.m. on 20 September 2003, Sonic Drive-In employee Nicole
Jensen had just finished her shift as a carhop. R202:83,140,253. Nicole was standing next
to the office desk waiting for assistant manager, Sandra Anderson, to count the money she
had collected, when defendant entered the building. R202:83, 144. Defendant's entrance
was unusual because Sonic Drive-In is take out only; customers are not allowed in the
restaurant. R202:75-76
"Give me the money. Don 7 do anything. Give me the money. "
Defendant "came up behind [Nicole],... put something in [her] side," and demanded
all the money: "Give me the money. Don't do anything. Give me the money." R202:84; see
R202:83, 144. Nicole immediately thought that the "hard pressure" in her side was a
weapon, or that it was defendant's "intention . . . to make [her] think it was a weapon."
R202:147-48.
Both Nicole and Sandra froze in fright and shock. R202:144, 171. Increasing the
"hard pressure" on Nicole's back, defendant pushed her toward Sandra and grabbed the bank
bag from Sandra's lap. R202:86, 147-48. As defendant turned to run, general manager
Matthew Wheeler, confronted him. R202:87,149,184. Defendant punched Matthew in the
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face. R202.-87, 149,184. Matthew "grabbed the back of [defendant's] sweatshirt/" ripping
it down the back side, trying to "yank [defendant] backwards [and] prevent him from
leaving." R202:184. See a/so R202:149, 185. However, defendant escaped and ran north
on 4000 West. R202:150, 187.
Defendant carried "the bank bag, " in one hand, u[t]he other hand was clutched. "
Kenny Christensen and his wife were just turning into the Sonic Drive-in parking lot
from 4000 West. R202:217-19. They saw defendant running away from the restaurant
carrying a bag with money flying out of it and being chased by Matthew. Id. Defendant ran
right in front of the Christensen's Suburban, almost causing Kenny to hit him. R202:219.
Kenny saw that defendant's sweatshirt was torn and that he had a "ridiculous looking beany
[sic] on his head." R202:220. Kenny also noticed that defendant was carrying a bank bag
in one hand. Id. Because defendant's other hand was clutched, Kenny could not tell what
was in it. Id. Kenny jumped out of his car, told his wife to drive into the neighborhood
defendant was running toward, and joined Matthew and another man in chasing defendant.
Id.

See also R202:186-87, 254.

The three men eventually lost defendant in the

neighborhood when he scaled a backyard fence. R202:187, 262.
"Are you sure it is not the cops you are running from? "
Earlier that day, Ruby Stevens, defendant, and two other men had been sitting around
Ruby's garage smoking cigarettes and talking about getting some methamphetamine or
marijuana. R203:278-79. Ruby lives in a duplex at 3915 Dean Drive, in the neighborhood
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just north of Sonic Drive-in. R203:277. At around 12:30 p.m. defendant left. R203:279.
Later, around 5:30 p.m., Ruby entered her garage and found defendant, "out of breath
and sweating profusely." R203:281. Ruby asked defendant if he was okay. R203:286.
Defendant said, "some guys had jumped him and beat him up." Id. But Ruby saw no visible
injuries on defendant. R203:287. She went inside and got defendant a cold washcloth, and
watched as he washed his face and took off his sweatshirt. Id. Defendant "tried to hide [the
sweatshirt] under some stuff of Ruby's]." Id. After seeing police cars drive by and also block
off the street, Ruby asked defendant "point blank," "Are you sure it is not the cops you are
running from?" R203:289. Defendant said, "No, no, no." Id. Ruby disbelieved defendant
and went out to the street and told police, "the person [you are] probably looking for [is] in
my garage." R203:291, 406. Sergeant Taylor, of the West Valley City Police Department,
entered Ruby's garage and found and arrested defendant. R203:407-08. See also R203:293,
408,412.
Jury voir dire examination. During the jury voir dire examination, the trial court
asked "the panel collectively," if any jurors had "immediate family members or close friends
who [were] sworn law enforcement personnel?" R202:31. The trial court gave specific
examples of law enforcement agencies: "highway patrol, [] county sheriff, [] police
departments of the various cities, [] FBI, [] CIA[.]" R202:32. Four jurors responded
affirmatively, two of whom were ultimately empaneled: Jurors Dong and Orfino. R202:3233; see also R121. Juror Dong revealed that his mother was a "contract linguist" for the FBI,
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and that he had also done some contract work for the FBI as a linguist. R202:32.2 Juror
Orfmo said that her "late husband" worked for the Secret Service for 20 years, and also
"taught criminal justice at the Salt Lake Community College." Id.3
The trial court's next relevant inquiry was whether any jurors "personally or any
immediate family member" had ever been accused of a crime? R202:35. The trial court
specifically asked if any juror or family member had been "arrested, charge[d]," or "brought
before the court and the processes of the court were applied?" Id. Six jurors responded
affirmatively, three of whom were ultimately empaneled: Jurors Kaller, Farmer, and Von
Niederhausem. R202:35-39; see also R121. Juror Kaller said that she had been accused of
"stealing" several years ago, but affirmed that the accusation had been resolved to her
satisfaction, and that it would not cause her to "favor one side over the other[.]" R202:35.
Juror Farmer responded, "Possession of marijuana, probably 25 years ago." R202:36.
He additionally revealed that his brother had been "convicted" of a non-violent felony within

2

Defendant asked the trial court to have Juror Dong "explain what a linguist is,"
but the trial court stated, "[w]e will come back to it." R202:32. Defendant was later
allowed to ask about Juror Dong's FBI experience, as set forth at p. 12, infra; see also
R202:59.
3

The trial court sua sponte excused for cause the third juror, Juror Huhtula, "[o]ut
of an abundance of caution," because his son-in-law was a police officer. R202:33-34.
The fourth juror, Juror Frankfourth, had a professional association with the Utah Highway
Patrol. R202:33. She was not challenged for cause, or perempted, by either the
prosecutor or defendant and did not serve as a juror merely because she was the last juror
on the juror list. See Rl 56-157.
8
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the last two years. Id. Juror Farmer affirmed that these experiences would not cause him to
"favor one side over the other[.]" Id.
Juror Von Niederhausern said her husband had been arrested for shoplifting two years
earlier, and her brother had been convicted of a felony. Id. Juror Von Niederhausern
affirmed that the shoplifting incident had been resolved to her satisfaction and that it would
"[p]robably not" cause her "to favor one side over the other[.]" R202:37. Due to her
"hesitancy in answering the [c]ourt's question," the trial court again asked if there "was
anything that occurred in that experience that would cause [her] to favor the prosecutor over
the [d]efense or vice versa?" Id. Juror Von Niederhausern responded, "No." Id.
The trial court additionally asked "how recently" Juror Von Niederhaursen's brother
had been convicted, whether the conviction was for a crime of violence, and whether the case
was "over and completed?" Id. She responded that it was "about 20 years" earlier, that it
was a conviction for "sex abuse of a child," and affirmed that it was over. Id. When the trial
court asked if the experience would cause her to "favor the [p]rosecution over the [d]efense,
or vice versa," Juror Von Niederhausern stated that "[she was] a strong advocate for victim's
rights." R202:37-38. The trial court responded that he would ask the question again and
"give [Juror Von Niederhausern] every opportunity to respond, and . . . say whatever [she]
would like[:] Do you believe that, as a result of either one of those experiences with the law,

9
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if you were asked to serve as a juror today, you would favor one side over the other in this
trial?" R202:38. Juror Niederhausern stated, "No."M 4
The trial court next asked if any juror "personally or any family member or any close
friend ha[d] been the victim of any crime where someone has broken into your home,
someone has taken property from you, someone has used identity fraud against you, any type
of a crime where you have been victimized by someone who committed a crime against you
or a member of your family." R202:40. Five prospective jurors responded affirmatively,
three of whom were ultimately empaneled: Jurors Esch, Dong, and Fuller. R202:40-44.
Juror Esch said she had been "held up by two guys" for three dollars, while walking home
from the university. R202:41. The trial court asked if,
[a]s a result of [her] experience, knowing that the defendant in this particular
case has been charged with robbery, to which he has entered a plea of not
guilty, but knowing the nature of the case that is before the court, would that
experience cause you to favor one side over the other in the trial today?
R202:41. Juror Esch said, "No." Id. Apparently not hearing her response, the trial court
said, "Your answer?", to which Juror Esch stated: "I can be impartial." Id.

4

The fourth juror, Juror Masif, said his "17-year-old daughter was involved with
shoplifting." R202:38. As set forth at pp. 11-12, infra, defendant subsequently
successfully challenged Juror Masif for cause on an unrelated ground. See R202:50-51.
The fifth juror, Juror Dietrich, said her biological mother had been convicted for a felony
five years previously. R202:39. Juror Dietrich was not challenged for cause, or
perempted, and ultimately failed to sit as a juror because her name was near the end of the
juror list. See R156-157. The sixth juror, Juror Goulding, said his step-son was
convicted of a felony in 1990. R202:40. He was neither removed for cause nor
peremptorily challenged, and like Juror Dietrich, failed to sit as a juror only because his
name was toward the end of the list. See R156-157.
10
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Juror Dong reported that he "had a camera and a lot of personal belongings stolen in
Thailand," approximately six years earlier. R202:42. He affirmed that the experience would
not cause him "to favor one side over the other in the court today." Id.
Juror Fuller said his brother's car had been stolen from their driveway "a year ago."
R202:43. Upon further questioning, he indicated that the case was resolved and affirmed that
the experience would not cause him "to favor one side over the other[.]" Id.5
The trial court also asked if any jurors would favor one side over the other merely
because defendant had declined to have an attorney represent him and was instead "serving
as his own attorney." R202:46-49. Two jurors responded affirmatively and neither was
empaneled. R202:47, 49. The trial court sua sponte excused Juror Stewart for cause after
he affirmed on further questioning that defendant's self-representation would cause him to
"favor one side over the other." R202:47-48. The second juror, Juror Masif, was questioned
in chambers and stated that he did not "like stealing," but that he could be "impartial."
R202:50-51. Notwithstanding Masif s rehabilitation, defendant, requested that Juror Masif
be "excused for cause," which request the trial court granted. R202:51.

5

The fourth juror, Juror Stewart, said his car had been "broken in to," and his
"stereo stolen," eight years earlier. R202:43. Juror Stewart affirmed that the experience
would not cause him to "favor one side over the other[.]" Id. However, the trial court
subsequently sua sponte dismissed Juror Stewart for cause on an unrelated ground, as set
forth in the body of this page, infra. R202:47-48; see also R156-157. The fifth juror,
Juror Hubbard, said her home was burglarized forty years earlier. R202:44. She also
affirmed that the experience would not cause her to "favor one side over the other[.]" Id.
Juror Hubbard was neither challenged for cause nor perempted, but did not sit as a juror
here because there were eight eligible jurors listed ahead of her. See R156-157.
11
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Finally, the trial court asked if there were any jurors
who for any reasons whatsoever could not and would not, if chosen, listen to
the evidence that's presented in the courtroom, follow the law given to you by
the Court, and decide this case fairly and impartially, irrespective of any
perceived consequences? Is there anyone who just simply can't or won't listen
to the evidence, follow the law, and decide the case fairly and impartially?
R202:52-53. Without revealing the reason, Juror Rivera affirmed there was "something" that
would "preclude" her "from being fair and impartial[.]" R202:53. The trial court sua sponte
excused her for cause. Id.
Juror Boivin indicated that she had several college finals over the next few days and
that she doubted she would be able to "make [them] up." R202:55. When asked if he
opposed Juror Boivin's dismissal "because of final examinations," defendant stated, "I
certainly wouldn't want to miss them." Id. The trial court thereafter excused Juror Boivins
for cause. Id.
The trial court then turned to defendant and asked if there were "any questions . . .
[he] would like the [c]ourt to ask regarding jury selection?" R202:59. Defendant reminded
the trial court about his "previous question" to Juror Dong: "[A]nybody in the FBI expressed
opinions or use you regarding our criminal justice system or those accused, if that has
influenced you in any way?" Juror Dong responded: "No, I don't think it has. All I do is
translate materials. I am not involved in any of the actual investigation." Id. The trial court
asked defendant if he had "any other questions . . . before we select a jury? Any questions
at all?" Id. Defendant said, "No." The trial court then asked if defendant found the panel
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"acceptable/' to which defendant responded, "Absolutely." R202:60. The record does not
reflect that defendant used any of his four peremptory challenges. See Rl 56-57.
SUMMAJKN i)V I ill'1 SUUHMMNI1
Point I. Defendant's challenge to the adequacy of the trial court's jury voir dire
examination—or to the impartiality of the jury panel—is precluded by the invited error
doctrine. The invited error doctrine applies because defendant affirmed on the record that
the trial court's jury voir dire examination had been sufficient—or that there were no
additional questions he desired to ask—and also passed the jury panel for cause. Defendant
thus invited any possible error and his claim should be denied on that ground.
Even if defendant's affirmative conduct here did not invite any alleged error, he
cannot prevail without establishing plain error. Under that rigorous tripartite standard,
defendant must show that an error occurred, and that the error was both obvious and
prejudicial. Defendant can show neither error nor obvious error because he affirmatively
signaled to the trial court that he was satisfied with the jury voir dire examination. Nor can
defendant show prejudice. Defendant's allegation of potential, as opposed to actual,
prejudice or bias is insufficient—as a matter of law—in this plain error context. Defendant's
reliance on State v. King, 2004 UT App 210, 95 P.3d 282, cert, granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah
2004), and its less rigorous abuse of discretion review is misplaced. King is contrary to this
Court's sound and well-established plain error precedent and it should therefore be
overturned. Moreover, even assuming, however, defendant was alleging that the seven jurors
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at issue here were actually biased, he still could not show prejudice: only four of the seven
jurors, if biased, had an arguably pro-prosecution bias. These four could have been
peremptorily challenged leaving defendant with the three jurors who were as likely to favor
the defense as the prosecution.
Finally, defendant's pro se status is no cause for a different result in this case. The
trial court was more than lenient with defendant and allowed him to ask every question he
requested to ask during the voir dire examination. The trial court also sua sponte excused
four jurors for cause. Although pro se, defendant exhibited an understanding and mastery
of the voir dire procedure. Defendant not only successfully requested additional examination
of one juror, he successfully challenged another juror for cause, even after the juror had been
rehabilitated. Thus, the general rule, that pro se litigants will be held to the same standard
of knowledge and practice as qualified members of the bar, should be applied.
POINT II, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence that he took any money from Sonic Drive-in. On appeal, defendant
claims the evidence is insufficient to show that he used, or threatened to use, a dangerous
weapon in committing the robbery. Because defendant raises a different insufficiency claim
on appeal than he asserted in his directed verdict motion at trial, his claim is unpreserved.
Although defendant raised a similar insufficiency claim in a pretrial motion to quash the
bindover here, a pretrial motion to quash the bindover is inadequate—as a matter of law—to
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preserve a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict. Moreover, because defendant does not
allege plain error or ineffectiveness, his insufficiency claim is procedurally barred.
Even if the Court were to reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge,
however, it lacks merit. First, under the plain meaning of Utah statutes defining aggravated
robbery, a robber who simulates possession of a weapon by pressing a hard object into a
victim's back and demanding money is guilty of aggravated robbery. Second, Utah appellate
courts have held that a robber's non-verbal conduct can constitute a "representation" of a
"dangerous weapon" under Utah law, thus meeting the elements of aggravated robbery.
Third, the majority of jurisdictions with analogous statutes have held that non-verbal conduct
alone is sufficient to constitute a representation of a dangerous weapon and that a robber who
makes such a representation may be convicted of aggravated or armed robbery.
Finally, even if the Court were to find that the evidence is insufficient to show that
defendant used—or threatened to use—a dangerous weapon here, the most relief defendant
is entitled to is entry of judgment for the lesser included offense of robbery. Although
defendant disputed the giving of a lesser-included-offense instruction below, he does not
assert the instruction was erroneous on appeal, nor does he contest the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish simple robbery.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE ADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S JURY VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION—OR TO THE
POTENTIAL IMPARTIALITY OF THE JURY PANEL—IS
PRECLUDED BY THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE
AFFIRMED ON THE RECORD THAT THE EXAMINATION HAD
BEEN ADEQUATE AND PASSED THE JURY PANEL FOR CAUSE
Even though the trial court allowed defendant to ask every question he requested to
ask during the jury voir dire examination, and also gave defendant every opportunity to more
fully question the jurors before concluding the voir dire examination, see R202:59-60,
defendant challenges the adequacy of the examination on appeal. Relying on State v. King,
2004 UT App 210, 95 P.3d 282, cert granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), defendant claims
that his unpreserved challenge to the trial court's jury voir dire examination is not subject to
plain error review, but rather, should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Aplt. Br. at 1-2.
However, defendant not only failed to preserve his challenge to the adequacy of the trial
court's jury voir dire examination below, he affirmed on the record that it had been sufficient
and also passed the jury panel for cause. R202:60.
Accordingly, defendant's claim of error on appeal should be rejected for two reasons:
First, it is precluded by the invited error doctrine, and second, even if the invited error
doctrine does not preclude review, defendant is at most entitled to plain error review which
requires not just a showing of error, but obvious and prejudicial error. See State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Defendant's reliance on King and its less rigorous standard
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of review—in this indisputably plain, ifnot invited, error context—is misplaced. As set forth
in greater detail in the body of this brief, King is contrary to this Court's precedent and must
therefore be overruled.6
A.

Where, as here, any possible error is invited,
plain error review is precluded.

Based on defendant's express declination of additional juror examination, and his
passing the jury panel for cause, defendant invited any possible error in the adequacy of the
trial court's jury voir dire examination. See R202:60. Defendant thereby signaled by at least
two affirmative acts that he had no objection, or that the trial court had asked everything
defendant deemed necessary to exercise any for-cause or peremptory challenges. See State
v. Finder, 2005 UT15, ^f 62-63,

P.3d

(declining to review claimed instructional error

where defendant "signal[ed] by an affirmative act that he had no objection" to instruction).
As a consequence of defendant's affirmative signals to the trial court below, his claim of
plain error on appeal is now precluded. See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, *{ 54, 70
P.3d 111 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will not
review the instruction" even under plain error exception) ;Statev.Dunn, 850P.2d 1201,1220
(Utah 1993) ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party

6

A similar King-based argument, that traditional plain error review does not apply
to an unpreserved challenge to the adequacy of the trial court's jury voir dire examination,
is pending before the Court in State v. Lee, Case No. 20040560-SC.
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led the trial court into committing the error"); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
1989) ("[W]e do not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on appeal under the
plain error doctrine. . . . [I]f trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, as opposed to a
passive, waiver of an objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error").
B.

This Court requires defendants to establish plain error when
challenging jurors for the first time on appeal: Therefore, State v.
King should be overruled.

Even if defendant's affirmative conduct is insufficient to trigger the invited error
doctrine, because defendant indisputably failed to preserve his challenge to the adequacy of
the trial court's jury voir dire examination, he is not entitled to relief unless he can show that
the trial court plainly erred. Under that rigorous tripartite standard, appellants must show not
only that an error exists, but that the error was both obvious and "harmful, i.e., absent the
error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome[.]" Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208. See also State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, \ 38, 24 P.3d 936. If an appellant fails to
establish any one of the three plain error prongs, the other prongs need not be addressed, and
the claim fails as a matter of law. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,61 (Utah 1993); State
v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993).
Where, as here, a defendant fails to challenge jurors below, this Court has consistently
required a showing of plain error. In Olsen, 860 P.2d at 333, for example, Olsen argued for
the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to remove an allegedly biased juror
for cause. This Court held that "[bjecause defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's
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failure to dismiss [the juror] for cause, Olsen is entitled to appellate review only if he can
show that the trial court committed 'plain error. '"Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added). Similarly,
in State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 7, 12 P.3d 92, Litherland argued for the first time on
appeal that two jurors were biased and therefore should not have been empanelled. This
Court held that Litherland bore the burden of establishing either ineffective assistance of
counsel or plain error. Id. at | 8. These cases control.
Until King, the court of appeals likewise recognized that a challenge to a juror for the
first time on appeal is reviewed for plain error. In State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App.
1994), abrogated in part on other grounds, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995), Brooks claimed that
his conviction should be reversed because the trial court did not remove for cause an
unchallenged juror who had been the victim of a similar offense. Brooks II, 868 P.2d at 82324. Brooks explained that "[wjhere defense counsel challenges a juror for cause, the decision
to remove the juror lies within the sound discretion of the trial court" and is thus reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 824. "By contrast,... where defense counsel did not object
to jurors for cause," the appellate court "review[s] the trial court's actions for plain error."
Id. This is important because "[t]he threshold requirements necessary to demonstrate the trial
court committed plain error are much higher than those required to demonstrate the trial court
committed an abuse of discretion." Id.
The court of appeals did not acknowledge Olsen, Litherland, or Brooks in King. King
instead relies on State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651
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(Utah 1991), and on a line of cases where the trial court either (1) denied the defendant's forcause challenge to a prospective juror who was potentially biased, or (2) refused the
defendant's request that a potentially biased juror be questioned further. See King, 2004 UT
App 210, ffif 10-15, 19, 21-22, 24-25, citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422-432
(1991) (holding trial court's refusal to examine jurors about specifics of news reports to
which they had been exposed did not violate Mu'Min's Sixth Amendment right to impartial
jury); State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, fflf 34-43, 24 P.3d 948 (holding trial court abused its
discretion in denying Wach's for-cause challenge to potentially biased juror, but finding no
prejudice where Wach peremptorily challenged the juror); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,795,
797-798 (Utah 1991) (remanding on another ground but "reminding]" trial court, which had
previously limited James' voir dire of potential jurors, "to take care to adequately and
completely probe jurors on all possible issues of bias, including press coverage"); State v.
Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123,1125-1129 (Utah 1989) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting defendant's for-cause challenges of prospective juror who was acquainted with
prosecutor and prospective juror who was a former police officer); State v. Julian, 111 P.2d
1061, 1064-66 (Utah 1989) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
defendant's for-cause challenge in child sodomy case to prospective juror who indicated she
believed children usually tell the truth but would reserve judgment until she heard the
testimony); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984) (holding it was prejudicial error
to deny Ball's request for further inquiry about reasons for prospective juror's abstinence
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from alcohol); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (holding it was reversible
error for trial court to deny Brooks's for-cause challenge to two jurors because they had been
victims of similar crimes—forcing Brooks to peremptorily challenge the jurors), overruling
by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), recognized in West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97,
If 16 n.2, 103 P.3d 708; Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, (Utah 1981) (holding it was
reversible error for trial court to deny defendant's for-cause challenge in medical malpractice
case to prospective juror whose background would cause her to place greater credence in a
doctor's testimony—forcing Jenkins to remove her with a peremptory challenge), overruling
by Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), recognized in West v. Holley,2004 UT 97, % 16 n.2;
State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-320 (Utah 1977) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's for-cause challenge in drug case to two prospective jurors
based on prior jury experience in a drug case); Wooley, 810 P.2d at 442,448 (holding it was
reversible error for trial court to deny defendant's for-cause challenge of a prospective juror
who had been a victim of a similar crime—forcing defendant to remove juror via peremptory
challenge); md Salt Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281,1282-83 (Utah App. 1987) (holding
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's for-cause challenge in a DUI
case to a prospective juror whose wife was broad sided by drunk driver). However, unlike
the appellants and plaintiffs in all of the above cases, King neither challenged the two jurors
at issue for cause, nor requested that they be questioned further. King, 2004 UT App 210,
fflf 1-7. Thus, King, unlike any of the authority it relies upon, is a plain error case.
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King does acknowledge that the above decisions refer to a "challenged" juror. See id. ,
2004 UT App 2 1 0 4 25. King also acknowledges that rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that "'[n]o person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge
is convinced that the juror can and will act impartially and fairly.'" Id. (quoting Utah R.
Crim. P. 18(e)(14)) (emphasis added by court of appeals). King holds, however, that the
requirement of a challenge only arises if the trial court "fulfills] its duty to detect and
investigate the potential for partiality so that counsel has the opportunity to intelligently and
effectively exercise challenges to jurors." Id. King concludes that the trial court in that case
did not meet this obligation because it failed to "fully probe the [two] jurors about their
potential prejudice." Id. at \ 26. According to King, the trial court's examination of the jurors
'"did not advance to the point at which... a dispute arose over whether the trial court should
have granted a challenge for cause.'" Id. (quoting Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, <[j
32, 71P.3d601).
King's reasoning crumbles under examination. On the one hand, King asserts that
because the two jurors in that case had some first- or second-hand experience with sexual
abuse, their impartiality was in doubt and the trial court was required to either remove them
or question them further to determine where on the "partiality continuum" they fell. Id. at
1ffi 15-17 (citing Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 ); see also King, 2004 UT App 210, \ 25 (citing
Woolley, 810 P.2d at 443 (quoting Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126 ("'When comments are made
which facially question a prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion
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may occur unless the challengedjuror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel
investigates and finds the inference rebutted.'" (emphasis in King))). See also State v.
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 55, 992 P.2d 951 (holding that a trial court's "undue limitations on
voir dire questions" in that case, together with its refusal to strike a juror for cause, were
sufficiently cumulative to constitute reversible error).
On the other hand, King asserts that the examination of the two jurors in that case
'"did not advance to the poinf" where a for-cause challenge could be made. Id. at f 26
(quoting Depew, 2003 UT App 152, ^f 32) (emphasis added). Both points cannot be true. If
the initial examination disclosed a potential or inference of bias—as King maintains—then,
under Woolley, Cobb, and Saunders, the proceedings would have in fact advanced to the
point where a for-cause challenge could be made and, absent rehabilitation, granted. See
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 55; Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126; Woolley, 811) P.2d at 443.
Because the examination in King revealed ^potential for bias in two jurors, King had
the "opportunity" to exercise a challenge to the two jurors. See King, 2004 UT App 210, \
25. Likewise, if—as defendant asserts on appeal—the voir dire examination revealed an
alleged potential for bias in seven jurors, see Aplt. Br. at 14-22, defendant had the
"opportunity" to exercise challenges to those jurors. See King, 2004 UT App 210, f 25.
Although trial judges must "take care to adequately and completely probe jurors on
all possible issues of bias," James, 819 P.2d at 798, this Court has also recognized that the
trial process is an "adversarial system," which allows "each side [to] tr[y] to select a jury
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which is most favorable to its position," State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 1988).
Applying these two principles, a trial court's discretion in conducting voir dire examination
must be "liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from
prospective jurors." James, 819 P.2d at 798 (internal quotation omitted).
Where King—and defendant here—both chose to forego that opportunity, and
expressly passed their respective jury panels for cause, their claims of error on appeal are,
if not altogether barred, subject to plain error review. However, no error could have been be
obvious in King—or in this case—where both King and defendant expressly passed their
jurors for cause. As in Moton, King's and defendant's "failure[s] to request that []
prospective juror [s] be dismissed for cause or to explore the topic of [the jurors] alleged bias,
especially when [they were] expressly given an opportunity to question [jurors] and to raise
any challenges for cause, constitutes a waiver of any error attributable to the [individual] trial
courts' failure[s] to do so of [their] own accord." Id. at 642 .
The court of appeals could and should have rejected King's plain error claim on this
ground alone. Instead, the court of appeals erroneously reviewed King's unpreserved claim
under an abuse of discretion standard. For this reason, King is not controlling here and
should also be overruled. The Court should also reject defendant's plain error claim because,
like King, he cannot show any error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's voir dire
examination. Moton, 749 P.2d at 642. See also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208; Harrison, 2001 UT
33, If 38; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Olsen, 860 P.2d at 334.
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C.

Defendant's inability here to demonstrate prejudice—or that a
sitting juror was actually biased—defeats his plain error claim as
a matter of law.

Defendant's plain error claim should also be rejected because he cannot meet the
prejudice prong of the plain error standard. As noted above, relying on King, defendant
claims that his unpreserved challenge to the adequacy of voir dire examination should be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Aplt. Br. at 1-2. If left intact, King's application of the
abuse of discretion standard effectively abrogates a defendant's obligation to show actual
prejudice under the plain error standard.
The plain error "harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in
assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 22, 95
P.3d 276; accord Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f 31 n.14. In Strickland, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that "it is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U. S. at 693.
In the context of alleged juror bias, defendants must therefore do more than show that the
juror was potentially biased, especially where, as in this case, all seven of the allegedly
potentially biased jurors implicitly affirmed that there was no "reason whatsoever" they
could not act fairly and impartially here. R202:52; see also R202:53-56.
More than a decade ago, this Court held that "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based
on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398 (emphasis
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added). The Court further held that Menzies' requirement of demonstrable prejudice requires
defendants, where possible, to remove with a peremptory challenge, any juror the trial court
wrongfully refused to excuse for cause. See State Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1997)
(rejecting Baker's challenge to impartiality of juror where he failed to peremptorily challenge
the juror: "[A] defendant whose for-cause challenge has been denied must exercise a
peremptory challenge, if one is available, to achieve a legally impartial jury"); Wach, 2001
UT 35, % 36, (recognizing Baker's "'cure or waive rule"' requires "a defendant whose forcause challenge has been erroneously denied to cure that error by using a peremptory
challenge, if one is available, to remove the juror or be held to have waived it55). In other
words, it is not enough —even where a juror challenge is preserved—for a defendant to
allege potential bias, but that is all defendant alleges here. See Aplt. Br. at 11, 19-22.
Indeed, defendant asserts that defendants like King and himself—whofail to preserve
challenges to either the adequacy of the trial court's voir dire or to the jurors'
impartiality—are relieved of the heavy burden to show actual prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 21. 7

7

To support his claim that the alleged "structural error'5 he claims on appeal
"requires no showing of harm,5' defendant also cites Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1
(1999) and State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204 (Mont. 2000). However, neither case arose in a
plain error context as did King and this case; rather, both Neder and LaMere address
claims of preserved error. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 4 (observing in this tax fraud case, that
the district court erred in refusing to submit materiality to the jury and thus issue was
whether such omission could be harmless); LaMere, 2 P.3d at (holding that the trial court
committed reversible error in denying LaMere's motion to strike jury panel).
Accordingly, neither case supports the proposition that the prejudice prong of the plain
error standard is excusable, even for a claim of allegedly structural error.
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Defendant—aided by King—thus turns not only the tripartite plain error standard on its head,
but the Menzies prejudice standard as well However, contrary to defendant's assertion and
King, the Mei iziesreq\ lii ei nent of acti lal pi ejudice applies as strongly to unpreserved errors
as to preserved ones See Di tm i, 850 I * 2(1 at 1208 ' '

.

King reasons that Menzies' actual prejudice requirement is inapplicable—even in a
plain error setting—if the voir dire examination does '"not advance to the point at which
a dispute ar[ises] o\ er whether the trial court M^^MI nave granted a challenge for cause '"

supra, at pp. 17-19, the examination of the two King jurors did advance to that point. I lad
the King jurors been challenged for cause, under Saunders, Cobb and Woolley, the King trial
court would ii LI\ i been recjuiiv,i \\° v ulier remove them v^x cause or rehabilitate them. See
]uu

Stiiuhhrr

^ I •

° •

^

!

V\^ nolec iii ^iih},ar; 13, at pp. 15-16, supra, Woolley and the other state cases
relied on in King, are inapposite because all deal with preserved juror challenges. They
are inapposite for another reason as well. With the exception of Wach, they all pre-date
Menzies, Baker, and this Court's adoption of the "cure or \vai\ c rule," At the time
Woolley was decided in 1991, it was "prejudicial error" n j 'uh "to compel a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should have been
removed for cause." Woolley, 810 P.2d at 443. Thus, despite the fact that Woolley used a
peremptory challenge to remove the biased juror the trial court had erroneously refused to
remove for cause, the court of appeals5 found prejudicial error. Id. at 442, 448. The
Woolley reversal could not have been obtained post-Menzies. See 889 P.2d at 400; Baker,
935 I\2d .-a 5o7.. ilach. 2001 III 35, ][ 36. For the same reason, the reversals in Brooks,
<v ! I\2d at 884, and Jenkins v. Fairish, 627 P.2d at 536-537, also could not have been
obtained.
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The same is true of the seven jurors at issue in this case. If defendant had challenged
Jurors Orfmo, Dong, Kaller, Farmer, Von Niederhausen, Esch, and Fuller for cause, the trial
court would have been required to either remove or rehabilitate them. Ibid. The "remove-orrehabilitate" requirement is consistent with the principle that "trial judges should err on the
side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges" given "the ease with which all issues of
bias can be dispensed by the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another
whose neutrality is not open to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^f 51. However, where no
such challenge is made—as in King and here—any issue of juror bias can no longer be
readily dispensed "by the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another
. . . . " Id. For this reason, a showing of actual prejudice is required. As recognized by the
United States Supreme Court, a defendant must show more than implied bias to receive a
new trial; he must show actual bias. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 217 (1982)
(holding that the Constitution "does not require a new trial" whenever a juror is potentially
biased and "that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the
defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias").
The court of appeals has itself recognized that a showing of actual juror bias is
required under plain error. In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that "[a]
showing of plain error requires, inter alia, a demonstration of actual prejudice, i.e.,
Defendants must show 'that they jury that sat was partial or biased.5" State v. Beltran, 2003
UT App 430, at * 1 (unpublished memorandum decision) (quoting State v. Evans, 2001 UT
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22,129, 20 i\3d 888) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 94 P.Jd 929 (Uah 2003 i (a con> is
attached in the addendum). Defendant has not and cannot do so here,
i\i .-./,

\p .

.

{.

i.»:,-: h .. :;!... : ', ;f.

^ p:; Br. at 21-22.

npaiiKii .miinh^iior presumably

prejudices dcjeinlaiils <md ri;<|ijir("S no shnwitii" nrii.iiin ) I lis pl;tm en or chum thus ILuls
as a matter of law. See Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61, Olsen, 860 P.2d at 334.
FA en if defendant were to allege that the seven jurors he challenges on appeal were
actually biased, i IL ^ < iuiJ IH»I show prejudice here. This is because defendant could not show
tha t 1 le was m mable t : ::i ii e ai i;; - alleged pi eji n

•

.<" peremptory

challenges. 889 P.2d at 398; Baker, 935 P.2d at 507; }hu ? 2001 I J I ' 3

* •

M ill : 1 lie :

number ofjurors defendant challenges on appeal does exceed by three the number of his four
allotted peremptory challenges, defendant could not show prejudice here because three of the
LU'

^ .-

could have c - e

••

•< : n i. ,ispro-proseci.!K \

*•* ;1] ^\-d * -.'.'.i - ••

-MI.-

,

]

• .;x ^eiendant ur^uuoi}
\ -suim:!^

Rule 18(d). I "tali Rules of Criminal Procedure, allots "each side" in a felony case
'fourperemptory challenges."
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jurors.10 See Moton, 749 P.2d at 642 (recognizing "each side" is allowed "[t]o tr[y[ to select
a jury which is most favorable to its position").
D.

Defendant's pro se status below does not excuse his burden
to show prejudice.

Defendant asserts that, due to his pro se status below, "the trial judge should have
been more vigilant when [he] failed to exercise his peremptory challenges or to object to any
of the jurors for cause." Aplt. Br. at 18-19 (citing Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \ 3, 67
P.3d 1000). Lundahl v. Quinn "cautions courts to be lenient with pro se litigants," but also
recognizes the "general rule," that "a party who represents himself will be held to the same
standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar." 2003 UT 11, ^| 3.

10

Specifically, assuming, for purposes of argument only, that all seven jurors were
biased, only four of the seven, Jurors Orfmo, Dong, Esch and Fuller, could fairly be said
to be unfavorably biased toward defendant because they had some connection to law
enforcement, or had themselves, or a close family member, been crime victims.
R202:32-33, 40-44. Defendant could have peremptorily challenged these four jurors,
leaving on the panel Jurors Kaller, Farmer, and Von Niederhausen, all of whom had
themselves, or a close family member, been accused or convicted for a crime. R202:3539. Assuming, again for purposes of argument only, that these three jurors were biased,
that bias was as likely pro-defense as pro-prosecution. Defendant's own authorities
suggest as much. See Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102,
1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that "Government's explanation it was peremptorily
striking the juror because a close relative was once convicted of a crime" was racially
neutral), and United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
"fact that a prospective juror has 'prior family involvement with drug charges'" is "a
racially neutral reason for the government for strike" under Batson v. Kentucky,Mb U.S.
79 (1986) (quoting United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1990))). Juror
Von Niederhausen also expressed strong support for crime victims, but given that her
husband had been arrested for shoplifting and that her brother had been convicted for a
felony, and that she affirmed she could be fair and impartial, defendant arguably, and not
unreasonably, could have thought she may be a favorable juror. See R202:37-38, 59-60.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Here, defendant is hard-pressed M show that he was not extended considerable
leniency »A inc ;rinl court. As detailed above, at pp. 7--'v Wi/»v. the trial court allow ed
defendant to ask e v ei > question he i equeste d to ask during the jury voir dire examinati oh. ana
also gave defendant e\er\ oppniliinih luiium: Iwlh v xjiiiiiii iLe |inoi < SVi RJ.02 >il hi\
Moreover, the trial court sua sponte excused for cause four jurors, see R202:33-34, 47-48,
53,55; Rl 56™ 157. Additionally, the trial court granted the one for-cause challenge defendant
made below, even after the disputed juror had been rehabilitated. See, e.g., R202:50-5l;

Defendant's striking of at least one juror for cause, and his concurrence in the trial court's
assessment that another juror should also be excused for cause, see, e.g., R202:55, amply
demonstrate ilia; wv.uid.ii.; unu^'Mood ;.u iu\ ^ L L lion process and how to avail himself
('if il

I)e(eiu.,:n:

• •

CDLT^-

should be held "to the same standard o[ knowledge and pi aai^e as :n

t , •.
: ;iu-.

CD ^

the bar," should not apply here
*

*

*

lii si IIIX, defei idant's claim of error in the tria 1 coi n t's jui > v oil dire examination is
precluded under the invited doctrine because he led the trial court into
when he indicated that the examination had been sufficient and passed ihe jur> panel ior
cause. J wen n duuidant's affirmative conduct here does not amount to invited, error, he
cannot prevail

\ ithoi it establishing plain en oi „, inch iding demonstrable prejudice.
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Defendant's allegation of potential prejudice is insufficient, as a matter of law, in this plain
error context. Moreover, because King is contrary to this Court' s sound and well-established
plain error precedent, defendant's reliance on that case is misplaced and it should be
overturned. Even assuming, however, defendant was alleging that the seven jurors at issue
here were actually biased, he still could not show prejudice: only four of the seven jurors at
issue, if biased, had an arguably pro-prosecution bias. These four could have been
peremptorily challenged leaving defendant with the three jurors who were as likely to favor
the defense as the prosecution. Finally, defendant's pro se status is no reason to excuse
standards otherwise applicable to any qualified member of the bar.
POINT II
DEFENDANT USED OR THREATENED TO USE A DANGEROUS
WEAPON IN ROBBING THE SONIC DRIVE-IN, WHEN HE PRESSED
A HARD OBJECT INTO AN EMPLOYEE'S BACK, PUSHED HER
FORWARD WITH THE OBJECT, AND DEMANDED AND GRABBED
THE BANK BAG FROM ANOTHER EMPLOYEE
In Point II of his brief, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show
that he used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon when he robbed the Sonic Drive-in.
Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant asserts that the aggravated robbery statute, and by incorporation,
the dangerous weapon statute, "require[] more than a mere touch or a victim's subjective
belief that a person has a weapon." Id. Defendant argues that this sufficiency claim is
preserved by his motion to quash the bindover, his motion for a directed verdict on another
ground, and his post-verdict motion to dismiss on grounds of alleged prosecutorial
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misconduct. SeeAplt.Br.at3(citingR93,164;R203:491-496). Although defendant raised
essential > Uic ^IHK insufficiency claim in his unsuccessful motion to quash the bindover
:^

i i -'»•

inadequate—as a matv

1O

* * '
(

'

'

qua^h ;:..

. . .^ •

riv.rr\- >-..-j\\{

Defendant's insufficiency claim here is thus unpreserved. It also lacks merit, however, and
may be rejected 011 either ground.
tidings oeiow. i ^-ei.i^.it moved to quash the bindover on the ground that
x

' * *.«

• i s i :'t ;

- • .• \. !. v,...

• , >

)i a facsimile of a w eapc n to i ob the

Sonic Dm c-ln. bee R93-95. lhc tiiui cuurt denied the motion following a hearing on u
March 2004. See R110;R20^ P ^

"lie inn) vourf- written findings of fact and

conclusions <•: ;.,.v were fiieu i>n ~.^ Muiv M -i-w-i, ..t < h * o However, because defendant

not sign the same until the last day of defendant's two-da> uiai.

^ \ PI i' '•

R203:491-494, The trial court reasoned that Nicole Jensen's preliminary hearing testimony
was si; 11 icient to establish probable cause that, in robbing the Sonic Drive-In, defendant used
• : :>! till eatened to i lse a danger c i is w eapon

E! 115 11 1

\ ccoi ciii lg to 1 3 icole ' defendant

approached her from behind" while she was '"counting out' pvnai.-'.
.MI;

' K* •

»nicthing in her side" which she thought was a gun, and demanded "all the money."
' < i v < )le "never considered [] defendant's behavior to be anything but a robbery attempt

• *'•-'

.• iced tl le object inhei back and dei nai ided ii ione> . r I d.
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Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, he did not again challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to establish that he used, or threatened to use, a dangerous weapon, in
robbing the Sonic-Drive In. See Aplt. Br. at 3 ("Winfield objected repeatedly to the
adequacy of the evidence in a motion to quash the bind over, at trial, and in a post-judgment
motion.55). Rather, at the conclusion of the evidence on the second day of trial, but prior to
jury instruction, defendant asked that the jury not be instructed on the lesser included offense
of robbery. R203:494. Earlier that morning, defendant also filed a motion to dismiss
alleging prosecutorial misconduct:

Defendant asserted that it was improper for the

prosecutor to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense. See R164. Although
no formal ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss appears in the record, the trial court denied
defendant5 s request that the jury not be instructed on the lesser included offense. R203:495.
The trial court ruled it would be error not to instruct the jury on simple robbery, "particularly
in light of the fact the defendant was pro se.55 Id.
Finally, defendant also moved for a directed verdict on grounds of insufficient
evidence. See 203:496. However, defendant asserted the evidence was insufficient because
the State had not "proved that any money was taken[:] They have never produced any money
that was alleged to have been stolen or recovered. And, therefore, I motion the Court for a
directed verdict for insufficient evidence.55 Id. The trial court denied defendant's motion on
the ground that "[t]here was evidence that money was taken.55 Id. Specifically, the trial court
found that there was evidence the bank bag was unzipped, and that "as much as $150 was
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scattered along the sidewalk[J" as defendant fled the scene. Id. Moreover, "[bjotli witnesses
testified that money was taken, as much as several hundred dollars, perhaps J> J J ** u. s : . - 00."

to the jury. Id.

.•

Waiver. "I Jtah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors
to the trial courts attention to give the court an opportunity to correct Ilk errors if
• ippiii|>nate."iV/\

-

. .! *j

•
;

specificity requirement arisen uul

'

" Misquotation v\\. '. w J

•

^. ^ ilk L\IIM»* -

relevant facts and considering them in the context of specific legal doctrine placed at issue."
Id. Accordingly, "a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a specific substantive
issue foi appeal " ' " \ i

defendant must raise liic sufficiency of the evidence

l

preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 111

-r \CL motion u± ubjcctioii to
k ) I o. 10 P. ui 346 R equiring

preser v ation of a sufficiency challenge by "proper moiion * * 0, lucth-n" is necessary for two

the evidence unless the defendant moves the cour t to do so or there is an 'apparent'
insufficiency." Id. Thu-. requiring preser\ ation "ensures that the issue v\ ill k brought to
*;;•*
•••* .*

i v . is

. , . hwii.,ij. .,
*'

\

-H-r'.

-

. "

i*

-•

.;, n,i\, t lu. opportunity to address the issue."
i

'^'

O- *

• ' • „ ! :
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•

L k

! - J >•:*

from deliberating foregoing relief below based on the sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that
a remediable evidentiary defect might not be perceived and corrected, thus strategically
facilitating the defendant's chance for a reversal on appeal." Id.
Here, although defendant raises essentially the same sufficiency challenge on appeal
as he asserted in his pretrial motion to quash the bindover, a pre-trial motion to quash the
bindover is not a "proper motion or objection" by which to preserve the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury verdict. Id. In deciding whether to grant a motion to quash the
bindover order, a trial court does not determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
convict, but whether there is "probable cause" to believe "that the crime charged has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it." Statev. Clark,200l U T 9 4 10,20 P.3d
300. Moreover, "[a]t this stage of the proceeding, 'the evidence required [to show probable
cause] . . . is relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only
get stronger as the investigation continues.'" Id. (quoting State v. Evans, 963 P.2d 177 1782
(Utah 1998)). Accordingly, when the trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the
bindover, it was determining only that there was probable cause to believe defendant
committed aggravated robbery, not that the yet-to-be-presented trial evidence would be
sufficient to support a jury verdict. Id. Further, any arguable inadequacy in the bindover
order was cured by defendant's subsequent jury conviction. See State v. Thomas, 2002 UT
128, H 7, 63 P.3d 672 (quoting State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992); see id.
at 567 ("[T]he question as to whether the information should have been quashed by the
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district court is moot because any defect was cured by defendant's conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt 11. It was therefore incumbent upon defendant to challenge the sufficiency
• : f the e\ idence b> "proper motion 01 ob jection"at ti ial "' Jolgate, 2000 ( J I ' 5 < I ''| 16
Although defendant mo\ ed for a directed verdict that motion 'was inadeqi late to
preserve his sufficiency challenge on this record. As set forth above, defendant claims on
appeal that the evidence was insufficient to show thai r e

M J . n threatens! tr- .

dangerous weapon S exe Vplt. Br at 23 30 Defer.^;,; > * ..m;. t\. u« A was mat t..c estate had

856P.2dat361.
FinalK. defendant's sufficiency claim is procedurally barred because he fails to argue
• .;: •,-. ;:un V.H,; ;;(uin!y erred in not sua sponte directing a verdict due to allegedly
- :.

. :• I-* -l'

s

,]

'

] lse d, or

:> •'> >

•

UILJ<' ;

- ,

ineffective for not asserting the same below, see Aplt. Br. at 23-30. State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226? 122c n " iTtah '°0:") ("Because Pledger does n-i argue iha- exceptional
circumstances' or V-iam cnoi i.i.vuho .i u\ K\\ oi me issue, we decline to consider it on
appeal")

'

Sufficiency. Even if defendant's claim were not procedurally barred, it fails under
a plain reading of the aggravated robbery and dangerous weapon statutes.11

11

Similar sufficiency challenges are pending before the court of appeals in two
cases: State v. Ireland, Case No. 20040502 (orally argued on 21 April 2005), and State v.
Johnson, Case No. 20040522 (Johnson's reply brief was filed on 22 February 2005).
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Defendant asserts that Utah law, "requires more than mere touch or a victim's
subjective belief that a person has a weapon." Aplt. Br. at 23. In effect, defendant asserts
that under Utah law, he cannot be found guilty of aggravated robbery because he did not
verbally represent that he had a gun. Aplt. Br. at 26-27 (observing that "a charge of
aggravated robbery would have been appropriate if [defendant] had made verbal
representations regarding a gun," but that "[defendant] is not accused of making any such
verbal representations") (emphasis in original). A plain reading of Utah statutes defining
aggravated robbery show defendant's claim is meritless.
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature's intent."5 State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute.
Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883
P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of the statute is clear, there
is no need to look further. Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, ^f 58, 63 P.3d
705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see also Okeefe v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear
and unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods of construction");
Visitor Auth. Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997)
("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the
uncertain facts of legislative history"); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
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Frederick, 890 P..2d 101 7 , 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction"). A reviewing

, \ pp 1993) Set u it so State v I }txh » i 2/01)41 ] I \ pp 2 75. U 7 981} 3< 1433 ("I J nambigi n >us
language .. . may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning," or in other words, "a
statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning"
(quotations and citations omitted).

• .

I ) nder f Jtah la \ \ a pei son com mits simple robber] if he or she "i iiila:\ x fi ill) and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose
or intent !,• depi. v. :he person permanently or temporal.- of the personal property;
i•

.

•

-

.

- u / . / •

robbery if in the course of committing robben, he:
Y

ises or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section

<b} cause serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c » lakes or attempts to take an operable motor - dm. le.
I JTAI I CODE A N N, § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). "Danger i\ is \\ eapon" means:
(a) any item capuhk of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to use * Ktiin * u >a •
:nv
7; r ,} ,i::i
f/' ' '- er that h^ J< in ^/^fr**! .r.s-'ii > it ->^
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.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added).

Defendant does not challenge on appeal that he was at least guilty of simple robbery,
only that he did not "verbally or in any other manner" represent a dangerous weapon under
section 76-6-60 l(5)(b)(ii). Aplt. Br. at 24-25. According to defendant, a "simple placement
of a finger or hand on Nicole's back created no such representation" of a dangerous weapon.
Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant further wrongly suggests that section 76-1 -601 (5)(b)(i) has no
application here because none of the robbery witnesses heard defendant say that he had a
gun, or saw the hard object he pressed into Nicole's back. See Aplt. Br. at 24 ("Because no
one saw the robber with a weapon or any other 'item' and [he] made no verbal statements
about a weapon, the weapons statute only applied if the robber represented 'in any other
manner' that he had 'control' of a weapon").
At the outset, defendant's innocuous characterization of the aggravated robbery
arguably violates his burden to marshal the facts, and the reasonable inferences therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H 42, 994
P.2d 177. Here, defendant "came up behind [Nicole], and put something in [her] side."
R202:144. She immediately thought the "hard pressure" in her side was a weapon, or that
it was defendant's "intention . . . to make [her] think it was a weapon." R202:147-48.
Defendant also demanded money: "Give me the money. Don't do anything. Give me the
money." R202:84. Nicole froze with "shock." R202:147. Defendant again demanded
money, and—using the hard object—pushed Nicole toward a second employee before
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grabbing the bank bag out of the other employee's lap. R202:84, 86, 147-48. iVs defendant
turned to run,, he was confronted by n third employee whom he punched in the face.

rippin: v !o*.:

"i

* • .1* k sdefendant] K;, \:\

leaving." 1<202:1$4. See also R2Q2:149, 185. Bui defendant escape^. .~J2:i5f, 18"/.
Under the plain meaning of the aggravated robbery and dangerous weapons statutes,
defendan t" s conduc t constitutes aggrav aic.. ; ^;:i-. r\ 1 ir- ni pressing a hard object or item

defendant's "use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to reasonably believe
the item \\\ as]" v\ as a gun and thus w as "likely to cause death or serious hodih iniun
i

t i.\

:»i..\NJ. x

.

" »i nothing is "apparent*

' capable of easy

as real or true and supported by credible evidence . . . ' 11 ebster $ Third New International
Dictionary 102 n r>(} < 1

Pressing a hard object in die Kick . *f (he \ iclim and demanding

money has a meaning thai is 1 eaoiiy perceptible; "I have a gun and I'm prepared to use it."
Indeed, N icole's "first impression5' w as that defendant ha • ;:l a A eapon. R 202: b I " 7.
Second, subsection 5( b)(11) makes plain that a representation of a dangerous weapon
need not be verbal, Defendant's use of die hard item or object here was a non-\ erbal,

1

""In the case of unambiguous statutes, this Court has a long history of relying on
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State 1 > Redd, 1,999 I IT 108, % 11, 99,2
P.2d986.
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representation, or in the words of the statute, by "any other manner," that he had control of
a dangerous weapon or gun.
In short, under the plain meaning of the statutes, Nicole reasonably believed defendant
had a gun when he entered the employee-only office of the Sonic Drive-In, pressed a hard
object into her back, pushed her forward with it, and demanded money. See section 76-1601(5)(b)(i).

Defendant's threatening use of the hard object was also a non-verbal

representation that he was in control of dangerous weapon or gun, an "item [] likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury." See section 76-1 -601 (5)(b)(ii). Defendant is, accordingly,
guilty of aggravated robbery.
Notwithstanding the plain statutory meaning, defendant insists that gestures cannot
convey a threat under Utah law unless accompanied by a verbal declaration, such as "I have
a gun."

Defendant claims that if he could be convicted based on his non-verbal

representation that he was in possession of a gun, the "workable distinction between simple
and aggravated robbery" would be lost because it would leave the aggravating factor—the
presence of a dangerous weapon—up to the "witness's subjective reaction." Aplt. Br. at 28.
Utah law contradicts defendant's claim that non-verbal conduct is insufficient to
communicate a threat with a dangerous weapon. In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah
App. 1995), the court of appeals upheld Candelario's aggravated robbery conviction where
Candelario told the victim he had a gun, but did not display a weapon or anything that
appeared to be a weapon. Id. at 277. The court of appeals carefully distinguished between
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a "facsimile," v : u \ \ "an v\aci and detailed copy," and "representation," which "is an
expansive term? nnu, while it can mean ca likeness, picture, model, or other reproduction,'

of something with the intention of influencing

action ' ' " Id, at 278 (citing Webster's Thin i

New Int'I Dictionary 813, 1926 (1986)) (emphasis added). This holding clearly states that
"representation" has a variety of meanings which includes not only verbal representation, but
also a likeness, picture, model, or othei reprodi iction ' ' ' I 1. l\ loreover, the court of appeals

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-601, "either in the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action."

Id. at n 2 (emphasis added). Thus, under the torra I interpretation and application of Utah
law. 'Licuum's use of ins finger or other artifice dining the course of UK vui.i. v vaierywas
a:i • • ,'HJT». n • • MM- rm in the sense that

-

.

: 4-eMc-v-n ,;

reproduction" ol a gun.
TliC eoiK-u-'on thai IIOIM crhal adion alone ma\ c^rhdiiute sufficient objective
evidence of a threai w ui. a dangerous weapon is euioed «: uiuci jui i>dictions v\ th similar
a g g r

*

*

' " ^

• -

'

• . *.;• • .

"

-

••

•

• *v

,

' .

' :

2001), Taylor claimed a fatal lack of "objective" evidence to supp* nt his conviction for the
armed robbery of a convenience store because he merely held a hand Inside his jacket and
pants *Wi ,w luliii- d. ^ct.^lner
'•-.ID

. J<; * ^ a -dek up. uiid "< ]pen the |^a>hj draue:

l'

'

»' •
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weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to
reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon .. ." Id. at 57 (citing MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.797). In affirming that Taylor committed armed robbery by placing his hand in his jacket
and pants, the court stated:
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the
victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our
courts have long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is
insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery. . . . Therefore, the
prosecutor must submit "some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon
or article" to the finder of fact.
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against
Taylor
went well beyond a mere subj ective belief that defendant was armed during the
robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either had
a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to "reasonably
believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the robbery,
defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his pants.
Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket and in his
waistband.
Id. at 61.
The court also explicitly rejected Taylor's contention that a gesture simulating the
presence of a weapon must be backed up by some kind of verbal statement:
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with
some specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery.
If there is sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the
defendant simulates a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe
he is armed and, by word or conduct, threatens the victim by announcing a
robbery or otherwise suggesting the potential use of the weapon, then the
defendant may be convicted of armed robbery.
44
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Id '

'

'

;*•> ^ io\ ,.. consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the

Gun or Pistol, &l A.L.R.3d l(Kir>. AVi\ -" " luwlhww

Shnv\ SSI S P,2d ~^5„ M6-367l< in

App. 2003) (Faulkner held what "felt like . . . a gun" to victim's back); State v. Arena, 663
A.2d 9^2. 974. 9^8 fConn. 199M (Arena appioached checkout counter w ith an ir^roxiinalc
:

^ _ •

"Put an u • *r •!»

^.i._

.. ,-

iag,poinicd ihv ..^ *. *r ,» -K. Uieckek and dialed.

- ,j "i \ • • •

(Ellison and his accomplice "committed the robberies by positioning their hands to make
their hands appear as if they instead were deadly weapons'"); People v. Lopez, 135 A.D.2d
,

%

* opez approached \ Min <IM m:. ! "Tlhis is a Pickup,.give

a gun"); People v. .Suez, 505 N.L.2d 945, (; M* u \ . \ . iy8" < (Sac/ '

. •

. - vw • > '

in paper out ofa V \ . stuck ilk v>bjcct in I:K- complainant's side, and demanded ;noiiv) y,
ifarf/e >. Mule 3:_ ; .. vi

f

-W (Ne\. 1976) (Bartle, a passenger in a taxicab, "'jabbed'

demonstrate that the vast m:n<>nf\ - ,»f jurisdictions interpreting statniop. i'm-ima. •, •-<
Utah's havefoundthat non-verbal communication, including unequivocal gestures indicating
the presence of a gun, are sufficient to establish aggravated robbery. Ibid. This is true even
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where, as here, the victim feels—rather than sees—the non-verbal communication. See, e.g.,
Saez, 505 N.E.2d at 946; Bartle, 552 P.2d at 1099.
*

*

*

Even if the Court were to determine that the evidence is insufficient to show that
defendant used—or threatened to use—a dangerous weapon in robbing the Sonic Drive-In,
the most relief defendant is entitled to is entry ofjudgment for the lesser included offense of
robbery.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-402(5) (West 2004), authorizes Utah's appellate courts to

enter judgment for a lesser-included-offense when there insufficient evidence to support the
greater or aggravated offense, if "such relief is sought by the defendant":
If... an appellate court on appeal... shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier
of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity
of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Although defendant does not expressly request the Court to enter judgement for the
lesser included offense of robbery if he prevails on his challenge to the greater or aggravated
robbery offense here, he does not expressly oppose it either. Indeed, although, defendant
unsuccessfully objected to the giving of an instruction on robbery below, see R203:494;
R146 (robbery instruction), he does not claim that giving the instruction was error on appeal.
Aplt. Br. at. 2, 23-30. See also State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, \ 15, 62 P.3d 444 ("A
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trial court may properly give a lesser-included-offense instruction even over a defendant's
objection, if there is clearly no risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and
pi eparation so as t :> ck pi i\ e hii n of a full and fair opportunit} 10 delend inmseii .). A> set
forth above, defendant Jamii onh (Li! linn n HWIIIIMMII t^nJaiM1 In ^hblhl

Ill

aggravating element of aggravated robber} , or that he used—or attempted to use—a
dangerous weapon ' . i.-bbii-u 'he "OI.K T>j\e-Tn

\\** "P

it 2, 23-30,

npikH in

defendant's narrow sufficient uiaiiengc i* !;i> avAiii--leo^inem that the evidence is

insufficient to sustain the jury verdict as to the aggravated element in no w;t) iindemiinrs
the uncontested elements of me lesser robber) offense. Defendant's acquiescence to the
lesser- -^ ..u;. v *\ \ ;isc ins; ruction on appeal arguably satis lies the requirement in section n6-

the defendant." I >ut another w ay; because defendant is nu • •!• .»e; ehalle-igin^ ;
of the lesser-included-offense instruction, !u

.an "claim no surprise at tiiia Cuuri :>

consideration t lesser incluue J offense." See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1160 (Utah
1992) (agreeing 1 v ith Joh nson that e\ idenc e w as iiisi ifficient to support her con\ ictiori for
attempted first degree murder and, despite fact Johnson did not reqi lest si ich relief oi I appeal,
directing entry ofjudgment on lesser-included-offense, albeit, Johnson had requested lesseri,.f^tv^- oi tense instruction below). See also State v. Bindrup,655 P.2d 674. 67^-676 (IJtah
IK)H"

,- - i ' . i ' *' *

*

JLCPIUII

in. , ,ai\; manslaughter offense

47
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after determining evidence was insufficient to support second degree murder verdict in a
bench trial).
Even if section 76-1-402(5) did not authorize the Court to enter judgment for the
lesser robbery offense here, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209, 1211 (Utah 1993), does.
In Dunn, the Court found that section 76-1-402(5), did not control the result in that case
because the Court did not reverse Dunn's second degree murder conviction for insufficiency
of evidence, but rather, instructional error. Id. at 1209. The Court thus relied on its "general
power to modify criminal judgments on appeal to direct entry of judgment for reckless
manslaughter against Dunn." Id. The Court reasoned that a directed verdict on the lesser
included offense of reckless manslaughter was appropriate for two reasons: "First, the jury
necessarily found every fact required for the reckless manslaughter beyond a reasonable
doubt in returning a guilty verdict under the second degree murder instruction it was given,"
and this was true "regardless of whether the jury found that Dunn caused [the victim's] death
intentionally, knowing, or reckless[]" because "it necessarily found every fact required to
convict Dunn of reckless manslaughter." Id. at 1211-12. "Second," the Court held that
"neither Dunn nor the State [would be] unfairly prejudiced by [its decision to reduce his
conviction to manslaughter." Id. at 1212. While the instructional error "may call into
question the second degree murder verdict; [] there [was] no question that the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts necessary to convict Dunn of manslaughter." Id.
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The Court further noted that Dunn requested and received an instruction on
manslaughter, and "[t]hus. i - «.a[d] indicated a. willingness to consider manslaughter as an
iilfmiiilK etostvonil decree iniiulcr " l\i I h.:il ubsei \;i(inn 1M H\\ t'\ <T, ilkl not din e Ibe n •nil
in Dunn. Id. Moreover, the court of appeals h;»-• ..v ^oh.,l ; > ; , .

.-.? -

.:A\-

a lesser included offense—absent any apparent instruction thereon—after determining that
there was insufficient evidence to support felony, as opposed to misdemeanor,, theft, See
State

i > L) rrm in, 9i

.

'• < ^ l

f

:.

jt/%

.,

*. i:.g -M/;/.. <V( »

i A-

In sum, even assuming some insufficiency in the aggravated conviction here, the
Court, may arguably enter judgment foi (he lesser included robbery offense under either
-1 4-02(5) < >r Dunn
< I- I" I U J I S U J N

'

Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery should be affirmed.
RESPECTFIIT T V ST/BMITTED on S ?April 2005.
-k : s-i. "K i I.I If
:

\A.\ A:onu*\ Ueneral

MARIAN DECKER"^
/Assistant Attorney General
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Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record[,] and the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented
are readily resolved under applicable law.
We are at a loss to understand Defendants' quarrel
with respect to items 1-4 and items 8-10 identified
in the search warrant return, as the trial court
suppressed those items pursuant to Defendants'
motion.
Item 5 was seized pursuant to the "plain view"

doctrine, which Defendants do not acknowledge in
their brief. They do not set forth any argument as to
why the "plain view" doctrine should not apply.
Therefore, we do not address Defendants'
arguments with respect to item 5. See Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23,lf
46, 70 P.3d 904 (declining to address inadequately
briefed argument).
Defendants challenge the admission of the
remaining items on particularity grounds. While the
warrant on its own may well not have satisfied the
particularity requirement, when read in conjunction
with the accompanying affidavit, the documents
sufficiently describe the items sought. See State v.
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985)
(affirming trial court's conclusion that "since the
affidavit in support of the warrant described
precisely the [objects of the search], the warrant
made specific reference to the affidavit, and the
affiant executed the search warrant, the affidavit
and the warrant could be read together and the
search was valid"). Accord State v. South, 932 P.2d
622, 625 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 940 P.2d
1224 (Utah 1997).
To the extent Defendants challenge the initial
entries into the restaurant and basement by
emergency personnel, those arguments fail, as such
personnel may enter the building to extinguish the
fire and determine its cause. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646-47
(1984) ("A burning building of course creates an
exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire
officials to fight the blaze[; m]oreover, ... once in
the building, officials need no warrant to remain for
'a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze
after it has been extinguished.' ") (quoting Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950
(1978)) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
[FN1] See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT
App 12,K 10, 994 P.2d 1283 (explaining that "[t]he
emergency aid doctrine ... is a variant of the exigent
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circumstances doctrine").
FN1. Defendants argue that "[t]here was
never any valid reason for the firefighters,
the police, or anyone else to enter the
basement area," but it was well known that
Defendants lived in the basement, and
furthermore, given the early hour of the
fire, it was entirely reasonable to assume
that Defendants may be asleep inside the
building.
Defendants next complain about the jury selection
process. Defendants' trial counsel, however, failed
to request that any of the jurors in question be
removed for cause. Thus, Defendants are "entitled
to appellate review only if [they] can show that the
trial court committed 'plain error' " in failing to
remove the jurors sua sponte. State v. Olsen, 860
P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993). Accord State v. Ellifritz,
835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App.1992). A showing
of plain error requires, inter alia, a demonstration of
actual prejudice, i.e., Defendants must show "that
the jury that sat was partial or biased." State v.
Evans, 2001 UT 22,K 29, 20 P.3d 888. Accord
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,U 34, 27 P.3d 1115.
Defendants have not demonstrated prejudice in their
brief, and reversal is therefore inappropriate. See id
*2 Defendants' arguments concerning alleged
improper juror conduct fail for the same reason. It is
true that
any contact between a juror and witness, party, or
court personnel that is more than a brief and
incidental contact warrants the attachment of a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice because it
has the effect of "breeding a sense of familiarity
that could clearly affect the juror's judgment as to
credibility."
State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (quoting State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,
281 (Utah 1985)). However, "the rebuttable
presumption of prejudice" does not attach in this
case because "the contact was between a juror and
an outsider under circumstances unrelated to the
proceedings." State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 757
(Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah
1996). "In such a case, there is a presumption that

the jurors have behaved properly, and it is the
defendants'] burden to provide 'some definite proof
of misconduct and that the said misconduct was
prejudicial.' " Id. (quoting Arellano v. Western Pac.
R.R., 5 Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527, 530 (1956)).
Defendants suggest that the alleged juror
misconduct compromised the "appearance of
fairness" at their trial, but they utterly fail to
demonstrate prejudice,
Finally, Defendants argue that the evidence was
insufficient to convict them of aggravated arson.
"To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury verdict, the one challenging the
verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). See Utah R.App. P.
24(a)(9). Defendants "ha[ve] not acknowledged, let
alone marshaled, the [adverse] evidence presented
at trial." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,f 14, 989
P.2d 1065. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits
of this claim. See id. at ^ 16.
We have considered Defendants' remaining
arguments and conclude they are without merit. See
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992) ("In
accord with the established principles of review
applicable to all cases, ... we [need not] analyze and
address in writing every issue or claim raised.").
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate
Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
2003 WL 22922361 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App
430
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